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F OR MANY PEOPLE, THE THOUGHT of not being allowedto fly may be hard to imagine. Flying across the state, across
the country, and even internationally has become so common
that some would argue the ability to fly is a necessity to function
in today's society. People travel by air for nearly every conceiva-
ble purpose, such as business, education, medical services, and
tourism; over 650 million passengers boarded planes in the
United States in 2014.' But do we actually have a constitutional
right to fly?
Some travelers would certainly think so. Anyone who has
spent time in an airport has likely seen these entitled passen-
gers: ticketed passengers who were bumped from a flight or
whose flight was significantly delayed or canceled altogether and
who proceeded to harass the ticket agent, demanding that the
airline put them on a flight immediately. Or those people who
are "victims" of their local airport closing or airline drastically
cutting flights to and from the airport and who write letters to
the airport or airline executives, petitioning for the flights to be
returned. This sector of Americans acts as though, and perhaps
genuinely believes, that they have a fundamental right to fly.
Other people, especially in the legal profession, know better
however. There is no guarantee to air travel in the Bill of Rights
(never mind that the Wright brothers' first flight took place
more than 100 years after the Constitution was ratified) .2 These
people likely agree that air travel is a luxury, not a right.3 The
opportunity to fly commercially is granted to those who can af-
ford to buy a ticket, who live in relatively close proximity to a
commercial airport, and who are willing to subject themselves
and their belongings to potentially invasive security procedures.
The opportunity to fly certainly must not be extended to every
American as a matter of right. Or must it?
Imagine for a moment that you were denied the ability to fly.
The government has placed you on the No-Fly List, not because
I Bureau of Transp. Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., http://transtats.bts.gov
(last visited Nov. 18, 2015). Statistic encompasses enplaned passengers on U.S.
flights from June 2013 to May 2014.
2 The Wright Brothers & Invention of the Aerial Age: Inventing a Flying Machine,
SMITHSONIAN NAT'L AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM, http://airandspace.si.edu/exhibi-
tions/wright-brothers/online/fly/1903/triumph.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
Traveling by air is analogous to driving a car, and as many parents remind
their sixteen-year-old children, "driving is a privilege, not a right." See Berberian,
P.A. v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1977) (holding that the right to drive a motor
vehicle is not a fundamental right, despite the relation to the fundamental fight
of interstate travel).
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you are a security threat to the country (assuming you are not a
security threat to the country), but because they are the federal
government and you do not have a protected right to air travel.
Even if you are afraid or simply hate to fly, you would likely take
issue with the government's decision. You may even instinctively
be thinking of avenues to challenge such a decision. You might
posit that your fundamental, inherent right has been violated.
But what is that right and where does it come from?
This article explores the constitutional right to fly. Part I be-
gins with a discussion of the history of the right to travel as it has
evolved into a right to international air travel. Part II introduces
a theory regarding the right to fly. In Part III, the limitations to
any such constitutional right are addressed. Finally, in Part IV,
the consequences on aviation safety are considered, should the
Court declare a fundamental right to air travel.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A. THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Gregory Hartch's article Wrong Turns: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Right to Travel Cases, provides a descriptive history of the
right to travel between states and acknowledges that the right
has long been established in American jurisprudence. 4 The Arti-
cles of Confederation guaranteed that "people of each State
shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State." 5
Although language enumerating the right of travel between the
states was not included in the Constitution, in 1823, the Penn-
sylvania court in Corfield v. Coryell recognized as fundamental
"[t] he right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside
in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, profes-
sional pursuits, or otherwise."6 In 1867, the Supreme Court also
acknowledged the importance of the right to freely travel be-
tween the several states in Crandall v. State of Nevada.7 The Court
confirmed this idea in Williams v. Fears holding the "right of lo-
comotion ... is an attribute of personal liberty . . . secured by
the 14th Amendment and by other provisions of the
Constitution."'
4 Gregory B. Hartch, Wrong Turns: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Right to Travel
Cases, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 457 (1995).
5 Id.; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV.
6 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (D. Penn. 1823).
7 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
8 Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
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Then, as Hartch explains, "the expansion of the right's scope
reached its zenith during the Warren and Burger Courts."9 The
significance of the right to travel was reinforced by the Supreme
Court when it held in United States v. Guest that private interfer-
ence with travel also fell within the scope of the right.10 The
Court declared that the right to travel "occupies a position fun-
damental to the concept of our Federal Union."'" As to its con-
nection to the 14th Amendment, the Court concluded:
The right to interstate travel is a right that the Constitution itself
guarantees, as the cases cited in the text make clear. Although
these cases in fact involved governmental interference with the
right of free interstate travel, their reasoning fully supports the
conclusion that the constitutional right of interstate travel is a
right secured against interference from any source whatever,
whether governmental or private. In this connection, it is impor-
tant to reiterate that the right to travel freely from State to State
finds constitutional protection that is quite independent of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 2
In 1969, the Court decided Shapiro v. Thompson, this time ac-
knowledging the right to travel as a fundamental right under
equal protection, in which "all citizens [are] free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhabited by
statutes, rules or regulations which unreasonably burden or re-
strict this movement."1 3 In response to the dissent's claim that
the Court was "'pick[ing] out particular human activities,
characteriz[ing] them as 'fundamental,' and giv[ing] them ad-
ded protection," Justice Stewart in his concurrence reiterates:
To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an estab-
lished constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protec-
tion than the Constitution itself demands. The constitutional
right to travel from one State to another has been firmly estab-
lished and repeatedly recognized. This constitutional right,
which, of course, includes the right of entering and abiding in
any state in the Union is not a mere conditional liberty subject to
regulation and control under conventional due process or equal
protection standards .... As we made clear in Guest, it is a right
broadly assertable against private interference as well as govern-
9 Hartch, supra note 4, at 460.
10 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Hartch, supra note 4, at 460.
11 Guest, 383 U.S. at 757; Hartch, supra note 4, at 460.
12 Guest, 383 U.S. at 759 n.17.
13 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969); see Hartch, supra note 4, at
460-61.
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mental action. Like the right of association, it is a virtually uncon-
ditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.14
The strong language used by the Court in describing the right
to travel demonstrated the importance the right had in our soci-
ety at the time. However, the Rehnquist Court brought in a new
era and, with it, the fall from prominence of the right to travel. 15
B. No RIGHT TO THE MOST CONVENIENT FoRm OF TRAVEL
The Court's "hostility to the right to travel" 16 became evident
when it held that people do not enjoy "a constitutional right to
the most convenient form of travel."1 7 In a rather whimsical and
entertaining opinion (as far as court opinions go), the Fifth Cir-
cuit addressed the issue of convenient travel in City of Houston v.
FAA.' In this case, American Airlines and the City of Houston
were challenging a regulation of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration that imposed a "perimeter rule" around Washington Na-
tional Airport, now Reagan National, near Washington, D.C. 9
The regulation prohibited air carriers from flying nonstop into
Washington National Airport from an airport more than 1,000
miles away; thus, American Airlines was prevented from offering
non-stop flights from Houston, Texas, to Washington, D.C. via
Washington National. ° In upholding the agency's regulation,
the court found that the plaintiffs argument "reduces to the
feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional right to the
most convenient form of travel. That notion, as any experienced
traveler can attest, finds no support whatsoever in Shapiro or in
the airlines' own schedules."21 Notably, however, the court com-
mented that "[n]o one has ever attempted completely to bar
travelers from distant cities from flying to National Airport.
Such an attempt might well give rise to a constitutional claim. 22
The Ninth Circuit seemed to reject that idea in 2006 with Gil-
more v. Gonzales.23 Gilmore sued Southwest Airlines, the United
14 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 642-43 (emphasis added) (Stewart, J., concurring) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
15 Hartch, supra note 4, at 464.
16 Id. at 465.
17 City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1188-89.
21 Id. at 1198.
22 Id. at 1192.
23 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006).
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States Attorney General, and a host of other defendants alleging
that the government's policy requiring passengers to present
identification before boarding an airline violated his constitu-
tional rights. 24 Gilmore claimed that when he refused to either
present identification or go through a heightened security
search, the airline refused to allow him to board his flight to
Washington, D.C. in violation of his right to travel. 25 The court
rejected Gilmore's argument holding that "the Constitution
does not guarantee the right to travel by any particular form of
transportation. '26 While not questioning his allegation that "air
travel is a necessity and not replaceable by other forms of trans-
portation," the court nevertheless found that, because other
forms of travel were available, Gilmore "[did] not possess a fun-
damental right to travel by airplane even though it is the most
convenient mode of travel for him. 27
The Second Circuit also articulated this "single mode doc-
trine '28 in the 2007 case Town of Southold v. Town of East Hamp-
ton.29 The plaintiffs in this case, a ferry service and the Towns of
Southold and Shelter Island, sued the Town of East Hampton
seeking a declaration that the town's ferry law was unconstitu-
tional.3 ° The law required ferry operators to obtain special per-
mits and restricted the types of ferries that were allowed to use
local terminals. 1 The court upheld the law stating:
[T] ravelers do not have a constitutional right to the most conve-
nient form of travel, and minor restrictions on travel simply do
not amount to the denial of a fundamental right.... [T] he Ferry
Law does not interfere with interstate travel so as to implicate a
constitutionally-protected right. "If every infringement on inter-
state travel violates the traveler's fundamental constitutional
rights, any governmental act that limits the ability to travel inter-
state, such as placing a traffic light before an interstate bridge,
would raise a constitutional issue."32
24 Id. at 1129.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1136.
27 Id. at 1136-37.
28 See Richard Sobel, The Right to Travel and Privacy: Intersecting Fundamental Free-
doms, 30 J. INFO. TECH. & PRIvAcY L. 639, 655 (2014).
- 477 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2007).
30 Id. at 41-42.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 54 (quoting Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1031 (5th Cir. 1991)).
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C. RIGHT TO INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
Although courts have held that a passenger has no right to
the most convenient form of travel, the Supreme Court has long
held the right to international travel." In 1992, the Ninth Circuit
decided DeNieva v. Reyes.34 The plaintiff, a Philippine citizen who
resided in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
(CNMI), sued the government of CNMI and Reyes, the Acting
Chief of its Immigration and Naturalization Office, for confiscat-
ing and refusing to return her Philippine passport.3 The court
noted:
[The] retention of DeNieva's passport infringed upon her ability
to travel internationally.... With respect to the substantive right
at issue, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the right to
international travel since 1958, when, in ruling that the Secretary
of State was not authorized to deny passports to members of the
Communist Party, it stated that "the right to travel is a part of the
'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due pro-
cess of law under the Fifth Amendment".. . Moreover, the Court
has consistently treated the right to international travel as a lib-
erty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 6
A decade later, the Ninth Circuit again acknowledged a con-
stitutional right to international travel, yet failed to treat the
right as fundamental. 7 In Eunique v. Powell, a passport applicant
was denied a passport because she failed to pay court-ordered
child support.38 The court recognized that "[ilt is undoubtedly
true that there is a constitutional right to international travel";
nevertheless, the court upheld the regulation under rational ba-
sis standard of review. 9
D. RIGHT TO INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL
Not only have courts recognized a right to international
travel, but recently courts also have begun to recognize a right
to international air travel. These cases have largely emerged as a
result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the federal government's
33 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
34 964 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1992).
35 Id. at 481-82.
36 Id. at 485 (internal brackets omitted).
37 Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2002).
38 Id. at 972.
39 Id. at 973.
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institution of a "No-Fly List."4 In Tarhuni v. Holder, the District
Court of Oregon analyzed the plaintiff's claims for substantive
and procedural due process violations of his right to interna-
tional travel and of his right to interstate travel.41 Plaintiff,
Tarhuni, was a United States citizen of Libyan descent who was
placed on the No-Fly List after traveling to Libya three times as a
volunteer in the wake of the country's revolution.42 During his
time in Libya, Tarhuni "provided cultural, language, and logisti-
cal assistance . . . by helping deliver medicine, medical equip-
ment, and supplies to Libya, and [he] often worked with Libyan
and Tunisian government and humanitarian organizations."4
Tarhuni was prevented from returning to the United States after
his last trip to Libya because of his placement on the No-Fly
List.44 As for Tarhuni's substantive due process claim, the court
confirmed that the right to international travel is a protected
right under substantive due process, but went a step further not-
ing that:
Plaintiff alleges "air travel is the only practical means of passen-
ger travel between the North American continent and Europe,
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Australia." Although this may
be the sort of conclusory allegation that ordinarily is not entitled
to acceptance as true at this stage of the proceedings, it is, never-
theless, consistent with the realities of the modern world....
Perhaps with the exception of a relatively few countries in North
and Central America, travel by air is not merely the most conve-
nient form of international travel, but, given time and financial
realities, travel by air is the only practical mode of international
travel for the vast majority of travelers .... Thus, the practical
necessity of traveling by air to travel internationally means being
on the No-Fly List is virtually a complete bar to such travel by
American citizens. Accordingly, the Court concludes such a bar is
sufficient to implicate a citizen's substantive due-process right to
international travel.
45
However, relying on Gilmore, the court stopped short of holding
that Tarhuni had a protected liberty interest in interstate air
40 See Tarhuni v. Holder, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (D. Or. 2014); Latif v. Holder, 28
F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014).
41 Tarhuni, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 1253.
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travel stating that "burdens on a single mode of transportation
do not implicate the right to interstate travel. 46
As Emily Landeros recently discussed in Air Travel and the No
Fly List-The District of Oregon Recognizes a Constitutional Right to
Fly, the Oregon court again acknowledged a liberty interest in
flying.47 In Latif v. Holder, a group of thirteen plaintiffs, com-
prised of citizens and lawful permanent residents of the United
States, including four veterans, were placed on the government
No-Fly List and were prohibited from flying to or from the
United States. 48 The plaintiffs sued the government claiming
they had a protected interest in their rights to travel internation-
ally by air.49 The court agreed, holding:
Many of these Plaintiffs cannot travel overseas by any mode other
than air because such journeys by boat or by land would be cost-
prohibitive, would be time-consuming to a degree that Plaintiffs
could not take the necessary time off from work, or ... are not
physically well enough to endure such infeasible modes of travel.
The Court concludes international travel is not a mere conve-
nience or luxury in this modern world. Indeed, for many interna-
tional travel is a necessary aspect of liberties sacred to members
of a free society.5 °
As Landeros commented, "the court's recognition of a constitu-
tional right to fly will undoubtedly impact future cases. The
court's establishment of a liberty interest in air travel represents
a shifting attitude regarding the importance of the freedom to
travel abroad. 51
In summation, the courts have established a constitutional
right to interstate travel, although not a right to the most conve-
nient form of travel; they have recognized not only a right to
international travel, but more recently a right to international
air travel. In each case that has addressed the issue, however, the
courts have stopped short of establishing a right to interstate air
travel, i.e., a right to fly domestically. Although, one must ask,
given the Oregon court's recent opinion in Latif v. Holder, how
46 Id. at 1273 (quoting Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir.
2006)).
47 Emily Landeros, Note, Air Travel and the No Fly List-The District of Oregon
Recognizes a Constitutional Right to Fly, 79J. AIR L. & COM. 163 (2014).
48 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014).
- Id. at 1142-43.
50 Id.
51 Landeros, supra note 47, at 171.
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much longer until the courts determine that domestic air travel,
too, is "not a mere convenience or luxury in this modern world"
but indeed "is a necessary aspect of liberties sacred to members
of a free society"?52
II. SHOULD COURTS RECOGNIZE A RIGHT TO
AIR TRAVEL?
This next part entails a consideration of whether Americans
are entitled to a general right of air travel and what the scope of
that right might be. The right to travel is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution-much less the right to air travel specifi-
cally. The courts for years have struggled with finding the origin
of a right to travel. The Court in Guest acknowledged this issue
suggesting that the reason for the omission in the Constitution
is because "a right so elementary was conceived from the begin-
ning to be a necessary concomitant of the strong Union the
Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel through-
out the United States has long been recognized as a basic right
under the Constitution. 5 3
Compounding on Guest, Justice Brennan commented in 1969,
"We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel
interstate to a particular constitutional provision.' '54 Over a dec-
ade later, Justice Brennan still struggled with the source of the
right in his concurrence in Zobel v. Williams-
At the outset, however, I note that the frequent attempts to as-
sign the right to travel some textual source in the Constitution
seem to me to have proved both inconclusive and unnecessary.
Justice O'Connor plausibly argues... that the right predates the
Constitution and was carried forward in the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of Art. IV. But equally plausible, I think, is the argu-
ment that the right resides in the Commerce Clause ... or in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... In any event, in light of the unquestioned historic rec-
ognition of the principle of free interstate migration, and of its
role in the development of the Nation, we need not feel impelled
to "ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particu-
lar constitutional provision. " "
52 See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142-43 (D. Or. 2014).
53 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
54 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969).
55 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1982).
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The right to travel has additionally been "inferred from the fed-
eral structure of government adopted by our Constitution"56
and "identified as a substantive value that must be delivered
equally as a type of 'equal-protection-only fundamental right.' 57
Given the numerous theories surrounding the origin of the
guarantee, it follows that the definition and scope of the right to
travel could be susceptible to numerous interpretations.
A. THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RIGHTS
Arguably the most well-known rights recognized by American
citizens are those articulated in the Bill of Rights. However,
American rights and liberties stem from several different
sources, including inherent rights afforded to the people not
explicitly listed in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitu-
tion. John Baker describes these unenumerated rights through-
out his discussion of the effectiveness of the Bill of Rights,
saying:
Alexander Hamilton ... argued ... that a bill of rights was not
only unnecessary but dangerous .... In his view the national gov-
ernment does not give rights; the source of rights is elsewhere. As
stated in the Ninth Amendment,5" the listing of rights does not
negate those retained by the people. The Federalist and the Ninth
Amendment make two points: (1) that any bill of rights is non-
exhaustive, and (2) that the source of rights lies outside the fed-
eral government.5 9
As Baker touches on, the Bill of Rights was the result of Anti-
Federalist concern over allowing the federal government to have
too much power, resulting in the states and the people having
too little power.60 The result was the Bill of Rights that guaran-
teed certain protections from the federal government.6" Many
Federalists opposed the Bill of Rights, not because they felt the
federal government should be granted a vast amount of power,
but because they understood that people have inherent liber-
56 Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986).
57 CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 802
(4th ed. 2013).
58 The Ninth Amendment reads, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
59 John S. Baker, The Effectiveness of Bills of Rights, 15 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
55, 61 (1992).
60 Id. at 61-62.
61 Id.
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ties.6 2 They felt adopting a list of rights would be seen as limiting
the rights of the people to those enumerated in the Constitu-
tion.6" So while the right to air travel "finds no explicit mention
in the Constitution,"64 it is not dispositive of whether or not
Americans possess a constitutionally protected freedom to fly.65
B. A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
At this point, a discussion of what American rights and liber-
ties are, and what they are not, is warranted. As a general state-
ment, American constitutional "rights"-those fundamental
rights that are at the core of American society-are "negative"
rights.66 "More often than not, fundamental rights generally op-
erate as a restraint on the government rather than as a right
granted by a sovereign to the people."67 With some exceptions,
American rights are generally considered to prevent the govern-
ment from intervening in certain aspects of the citizen's life.68
On the other hand, many countries throughout the world
have adopted constitutions and laws that grant "positive" rights
to the people.6" Positive rights require that the government pro-
vide to the people the subject of the right, not simply refrain
from preventing the people to obtain it themselves. For exam-
ple, the Republic of South Africa's Bill of Rights provides that
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
65 The Supreme Court has been sporadic with its recognition of inherent
rights and whether those unenumerated rights deserve "constitutional" protec-
tion. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that Ameri-
cans have a constitutionally protected interest, through the Second Amendment,
in "the inherent right of self-defense"). But see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting the contention that education is neces-
sary to the effective exercise of speech and intelligent voting and holding that
there is no right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution).
66 The author understands that there are several positive rights throughout the
Constitution, such as a right to a jury trial and right to an attorney. The focus
however is on the general notion of fundamental American rights.
67 Douglas Cty. Sch. v. Heineman, No. 1028017, 2006 WL 4911463 (Neb. Dist.
Ct. Dec. 22, 2006).
68 For example, Americans enjoy the freedom of speech, the freedom of the
press, the freedom to peaceably assemble, and the freedom to petition the Gov-
ernment without unreasonable interference from the state. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
69 See S. AmR. CONST. (1996); Jean-Francois Akandji-Kombe, POSITIVE OBLIGA-
TIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS
HANDBOOKS, No. 7 (2007).
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everyone has the right to access adequate housing and health
care, and the state must take reasonable efforts to provide these
resources. 7
0
In other words, in America the right to housing, for example,
guarantees that all citizens can obtain adequate housing without
government intervention; 71 in South Africa, the right to housing
guarantees that the government will make best efforts to provide
housing to all citizens.72 Positive rights are basic entitlements,
whereas negative rights are true "freedoms" from government
intervention. This brief reminder of the nature of American
constitutional rights is relevant when attempting to define a con-
stitutional right to air travel: the right, should one exist, would
guarantee that the government refrain from unreasonable inter-
ference in a person's ability to travel by air. The right would not
guarantee that the government provide a person with air travel
if he could not secure a flight himself.
C. A CONSTITUTIONAL "RIGHT TO FLY"?
This article has outlined the fundamental right to travel as it
has progressed into a right to international air travel, stopping
just short of the right to domestic air travel. The author has pos-
ited that the right to air travel need not be enumerated in the
Constitution and has provided a short summary of what Ameri-
can constitutional rights are as compared to positive rights in
other countries around the world. So, should courts recognize
an inherent "right to fly"?
1. The Inherent Right to Fly
Certainly there is an argument for such a right.73 One theory,
advanced in The Right to Travel and Privacy: Intersecting Fundamen-
70 S. AmR. CONST. (1996), Section 2, para. 26, 27 (" (1) Everyone has the right to
have access to adequate housing. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive real-
isation of this right .... Everyone has the right to have access to (a) health care
services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security ... (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of
these rights...").
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The U.S. Constitution's Takings Clause requires
that the government pay an owner just compensation if private property is taken
for public use.
72 S. AmR. CONST. (1996), Section 2, para. 26.
73 And presumably the Fifth Circuit may agree. See City of Houston v. FAA, 679
F.2d 1184, 1192 (5th Cir. 1982) (commenting that an attempt to completely bar a
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tal Freedoms by Richard Sobel, is that air travel is a mode of inter-
state travel and if "any mode of transportation is restricted, then
the constitutionally enshrined right of travel is abridged."
74
Sobel opines that "the travel right is a multi-modal one that en-
compasses all forms of transport. '75 The theory essentially pro-
poses that the right to travel is a broad, "virtually unconditional
personal right"76 and every method of transportation is pro-
tected under the right.77 This is a compelling argument: After
all, the Supreme Court would generally not deny ajournalist the
constitutional right to publish in newspapers simply because
there were other media outlets available. And the Court did not
hold that a man had no constitutional guarantee to own a hand-
gun in his home simply because there were other methods of
self-defense available v.7 Likewise, the Court should not find that
a passenger has no fundamental right to air travel simply be-
cause there are other modes of interstate transportation
available.
In theory, the reasoning is sound; in reality, the lower courts
have flatly rejected this argument.79 The courts instead consider
the ends to be the constitutional right, not the means-that is, a
person has the freedom to relocate to another state, she does
not have the freedom to travel there by any particular means.8 "
As long as there are other methods of traveling interstate availa-
ble, then a person is afforded no right to any one specific mode
of travel.
2. In Modern Society, Air Transportation is the Only Practical
Method of Travel
Another argument for recognizing a constitutional right to fly
is that travel by other means is simply not realistic in today's
time. As to the single mode doctrine, the "practical method" ad-
vocates would respond by asserting that air transportation is the
only method available for many travelers. Sobel adopts this argu-
traveler from flying to a distant city "might well give rise to a constitutional
claim").
74 Sobel, supra note 28, at 666.
75 Id. at 660.
76 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).
77 See Sobel, supra note 28, at 666.
78 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
79 See Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006); City of Houston v.
FAA, 679 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982).
80 See Gilmore, 435 F.3d 1125; City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1184.
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ment to attack the single mode doctrine and cites two cases
from the 1970s in support."' In a footnote in United States v.
Kroll, the Eighth Circuit was not persuaded by, what would years
later become, the single mode doctrine, noting "in many situa-
tions, flying may be the only practical means of transporta-
tion.18 2 The court in United States v. Albarado likewise
acknowledged that "it would work a considerable hardship on
many air travelers to be forced to utilize an alternate form of
transportation, assuming one exists at all."'8 3
Interestingly, William Mann mentioned the idea in a pre-9/11
article discussing the legal issues on banning unruly passengers
in the sky."4 Mann suggested that "[o]ne could most definitely
make a strong case that in today's lightning-quick world, air
transportation is the only 'practicable' route of travel if one is to
actively participate in society. .... Thus, banning passengers
from air travel seems to implicate the Constitution."8 5
For many, the ability to board a plane and be in a destination
across the country in a matter of hours is more than a luxury, it
is a necessity. The same justifications the court gave to establish
a right to international air travel can just as easily be said for a
right to domestic air travel: It is not necessarily true that air
travel "is a mere convenience in light of the realities of our mod-
ern world. Such an argument ignores the numerous reasons
that an individual may have for wanting or needing to travel [ ]
quickly such as the birth of a child, the death of a loved one, a
business opportunity, or a religious obligation."8 6 In a global
world where communication travels in seconds, where docu-
ments, pictures, and messages are uploaded, downloaded, and
tweeted in the blink of an eye, and where technology is allowing
people to work faster, harder and smarter-and across farther
8I Sobel, supra note 28, at 658-59.
82 United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 887 n.2 (8th Cir. 1973) (quotation
marks omitted); see Sobel, supra note 28, at 658-59.
83 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d Cir. 1974); see Sobel, supra
note 28, at 659.
84 William Mann, Comment, All the (Air) Rage: Legal Implications Surrounding
Airline and Government Bans on Unruly Passengers in the Sky, 65J. AiR L. & CoM. 857
(2000). The article is an interesting read considering the complete overhaul of
security in the aviation field just a few years after publication.
85 Id. at 870. Even an author fifteen years ago recognized the significance of air
travel in American society. Understandably, the attacks on September 11, 2001,
greatly impacted the aviation industry and prompted the government's No-Fly
List (and subsequent litigation). However Mann's sentiments of air travel and its
prominence in the lives of many Americans still holds true today.
86 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1148 (D. Or. 2014).
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distances, is it fair to say that travel by airplane is still just the
most convenient mode of travel? Indeed, we would not expect a
person to drive across the country for an afternoon job inter-
view. We would not expect a student to forfeit her attendance at
an ideal college on the opposite coast because she desires to go
home for holidays and family occasions. It is possible that travel
by air "is not merely the most convenient form of [ ] travel, but,
given time and financial realities, travel by air is the only practi-
cal mode of [ ] travel for [many] travelers." '
On the other hand, some of these same arguments in support
of a right to air travel are also some of the best arguments
against a recognized right to fly. With today's technology there is
seemingly no need to travel across the country for a business
meeting or move away from home to attend college.88 A larger
percentage of the population is working from home and many
companies are embracing the technology and culture that allow
employees to work remotely.8 9 Products like Skype and Face-
Time provide video calling capabilities that enable people to
connect with loved ones and be relatively "present" at special
occasions.90 As the country becomes more cyber-reliant, inter-
state air travel may in fact become less of a necessity.
3. When Air Travel is the Only Means to a Constitutionally
Protected Ends
In certain circumstances, it is easy to sympathize with the ar-
gument for a constitutional right to fly (the need to travel across
the country for a brief but important life event, for example),
but many, arguably most, flights do not rise to such significance.
A plaintiff likely would find difficulty in convincing a court that
he had a fundamental right to fly from Washington, D.C. to New
York City, an easy trip by either car, bus, or train.9 1 Thus, the
87 Tarhuni v. Holder, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1271 (D. Or. 2014).
88 With cyber-meeting technology and online classes, it is possible to remain in
one location and still be present at business, education, and social events.
89 See Peter Mateyka et al., Home-Based Workers in the United States: 2010, Current
Population Reports, U.S. CENSUS BuREAu (Oct. 2012), https://www.census.gov/
prod/2012pubs/p70-132.pdf.
90 Christopher Breen, Video Chatting with Family: How to Use FaceTime, Skype, or
Google Hangouts to Keep in Touch, MACWORLD (Dec. 25, 2014, 4:22 AM), http://
www.macworld.com/article/2863332/video-chatting-with-family-how-to-use-face-
time-skype-or-google-hangouts-to-keep-in-touch.html.
91 See maps.google.com (the drive by car could be around four hours);
www.greyhound.com (a trip by bus would take approximately four and a half
hours); www.amtrak.com (a train trip could be as quick as three hours).
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court's reluctance to recognize a universal right to fly when
other modes of transportation are available is understandable.
The focus, therefore, should not be on the importance of the
air travel itself but on the object of that air travel. The freedom
to fly should be a constitutional guarantee only when the under-
lying purpose of the air travel is a protected right and when
flight is the only practical way to achieve that purpose. Justice
Scalia used a similar analysis in Heller.12 Part of the Court's rea-
soning in striking down D.C.'s ban on handguns was essentially
that."the inherent right of self-defense [is] central to the Second
Amendment" and handguns are the preferred method of self-
defense in the home; therefore, by banning the most preferred
method to achieving a person's underlying, pre-existing right of
self-defense, the District of Columbia violated Heller's constitu-
tional right." The Court looked to the underlying right (self-
defense), the method at issue of achieving that right (owning a
handgun), and concluded that a complete ban on handguns
was, by extension, an unconstitutional restriction of self-defense
in violation of the Second Amendment.
Additionally, James Dwyer recently published a thesis regard-
ing the legality of same-sex marriage that provides a parallel the-
ory to this proposed freedom to fly.94 In his article Same-Sex
Cynicism and the Self-Defeating Pursuit of Social Acceptance Through
Litigation, Dwyer suggests that same-sex couples no longer have
a "fundamental liberty" to legal marriage because Lawrence v.
Texas95 "render[ed] unconstitutional laws prohibiting intimacy
and cohabitation outside of marriage for opposite-sex partners,
[thus] legal marriage is no longer a fundamental right in any
state for anyone."96 Historically many states criminalized anyone
who had sex or even cohabitated outside of marriage, meaning
"denying a marriage license to [even an opposite-sex] couple
was therefore an infringement of a negative liberty, a right to
the freedom to fulfill basic human needs and desires,"97 includ-
ing having children.9 8 And as Dwyer states, "that, crucially, is why
92 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
93 Id. at 628.
94 James Dwyer, Same-Sex Cynicism and the Self-Defeating Pursuit of Social Acceptance
Through Litigation, 68 SMU L. REV. 1 (2015).
95 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
96 Dwyer, supra note 94, at 103.
97 Id. at 117.
98 In other words, some states made it illegal for non-married couples to live
together, therefore the only legal way to satisfy a person's fundamental right to
intimacy was to get married.
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the Supreme Court, in the now-distant past, characterized legal
marriage as a matter of 'fundamental liberty': because it was the
means by which the state controlled inter-personal intimacy."99
When Lawrence held the state laws unconstitutional, thus elimi-
nating the underlying liberty of inter-personal intimacy, the sta-
tus of legal marriage as a fundamental right was also
eliminated. 100
The same theory can be said of the right to air travel. 10 1 Flying
allows us to fulfill many rights: the right to pursue business and
education; the right to visit family and be with loved ones; the
right to lobby elected leaders in Washington, D.C.; the right to
fulfill a religious obligation. 10 2 It is when the infringement on
the ability to fly completely eliminates the possibility of fulfilling
these underlying constitutional rights that the court should rec-
ognize a legal right to air travel.
This type of analysis was essentially used by the courts to deter-
mine that people enjoy the right to travel generally, and the
right to international air travel specifically.10 3 The various courts
have reached the conclusion that the right to travel exists after
first indicating that the travel served a fundamental purpose.' 4
As early as 1823, the Corfield court acknowledged "[t]he right of
a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other
state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or
99 Dwyer, supra note 94, at 117-18. Because legal marriage was the only way to
satisfy the right to intimacy, legal marriage itself became a fundamental right: If
the state were to take away marriage, it would take away the only avenue to
achieve the underlying fundamental right.
100 Id. Lawrence allowed for non-married couples to satisfy their fundamental
right to intimacy without getting married, therefore marriage lost its "fundamen-
tal right" status. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
101 When the underlying object of the travel (education purposes, business op-
portunities, religious expression, etc.) is a fundamental right, and air travel-
international or domestic-is the only way to achieve that objective, the air travel
itself should elevate to fundamental right status.
102 "The impact on a citizen who cannot use a commercial aircraft is
profound.... As a practical matter, an affected person is restricted in his ability
to visit family and friends ... An inability to travel by air also restricts one's ability
to associate more generally, and effectively limits education, employment and
professional opportunities .... An inability to fly likewise affects the possibility of
recreational and religious travel." Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 520, 528
(E.D. Va. 2014); Sobel, supra note 28, at 659.
103 SeeKent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1958); Crandall v. State of Nevada,
73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867); Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1149 (D. Or. 2014);
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (D. Penn. 1823).
104 See Kent, 357 U.S. at 126-27; Crandall, 73 U.S. at 44; Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at
1149; Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
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otherwise.""1 5 In 1867, the Supreme Court elaborated on the
right to travel stating, "[the citizen] has the right to come to the
seat of government ... He has a right to free access to ... the
courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its na-
ture independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must
pass in the exercise of it."'0 6 In describing the social values of
the "freedom of movement" abroad, 11 7 the Supreme Court
proclaimed:
Foreign correspondents and lecturers on public affairs need first-
hand information. Scientists and scholars gain greatly from con-
sultations with colleagues in other countries. Students equip
themselves for more fruitful careers in the United States by in-
struction in foreign universities. Then there are reasons close to
the core of personal life-marriage, reuniting families, spending
hours with old friends. Finally, travel abroad enables American
citizens to understand that people like themselves live in Europe
and helps them to be well-informed on public issues.'
This focus on the underlying right is especially apparent in
Latifv. Holder. 9 In its opinion, the court detailed each plaintiff
and his or her purpose for travel, concluding that a person has
many reasons for traveling overseas and that, air transport being
the only practical method of international travel, prohibiting
the plaintiffs from flying internationally was a violation of their
constitutionally protected liberty interests.110 The court recited
the hardships the plaintiffs endured by being placed on the No
Fly List, stating:
Latif... is unable to travel from the United States to Egypt to
resume studies or to Saudi Arabia to perform a hajj.'1
Because Knaeble was unable to fly home for a required medical
examination, his employer rescinded its job offer for a position
in Qatar.
105 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
106 Crandall, 73 U.S. at 44.
107 Many of these same social values of traveling abroad apply to traveling
among the states as well.
108 Kent, 357 U.S. at 126-27.
109 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1149. As the court instructs "[o]ne need not look beyond
the hardships suffered by Plaintiffs to understand the significance of the depriva-
tion of the right to travel internationally."
110 Id. at 1143-46, 1149.
III A hajj is a religious pilgrimage and Islamic obligation.
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Since May 2010 Washburn has been separated from his wife who
is in Ireland because she has been unable to obtain a visa to
come to the United States and Washburn is unable to fly to
Ireland.
In February 2010 Ghaleb attempted to travel from Yemen where.,
his wife and children were living to San Francisco via Frank-
furt.... Because Ghaleb cannot fly, he cannot go to Yemen to be
with his ill mother or to see his brothers or sisters.
Rana moved to Pakistan to pursue a master's degree in Islamic
studies in 2009 .... In October 2012 Rana was six-months preg-
nant and again attempted to return to New York to receive
needed medical care and to deliver her child .... Rana was not
able to find a safe alternative to travel to the United States before
the birth of her child. In November 2010 the United States gov-
ernment offered Rana a "one-time waiver," which she has not
used because she fears she would not be able to return to Paki-
stan to be with her husband.... Mashal owns a dog-training busi-
ness. Because he is unable to fly, he has lost clients; had to turn
down business; and has been prevented from attending his sister-
in-law's graduation in Hawaii, the wedding of a close friend, the
funeral of a close friend, and fundraising events for the non-
profit organization that he founded. ... Because he is unable to
fly, Ahmed was unable to travel to Yemen in 2012 when his
brother died and is unable to travel to Yemen to visit his ex-
tended family and to manage property that he owns in Yemen. 112
Each of the plaintiffs were prevented from fulfilling basic funda-
mental rights: pursuing education or business, practicing relig-
ion, being present at the birth or death of a family member, or
reuniting with a spouse or loved one.'13 Although the court rec-
ognized the plaintiffs' rights of international air travel, and did
not go so far to conclude that they had any rights of domestic air
travel, certainly interstate travelers seek many of the same pur-
poses as international travelers." 4 The occasions may be rare,
but occasions nonetheless, when a plaintiff is prohibited from
traveling domestically to the detriment of his constitutionally
protected liberty interest-a situation where flight is not simply
the "most convenient" form of travel, but the only practical
mode of travel available to fulfill an inherent, fundamental
right. For example, it is just as likely that someone would miss
112 Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1143-46.
113 Id.
114 See id.; Landeros, supra note 47.
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the sudden birth of a baby or death of a family member if they
were forced to drive cross-country as it would for someone to
cross the ocean. It is possible that a candidate would be passed
over for employment opportunities because he was unable to
board a flight and instead was forced to make a long drive or
take a train. The situation may arise where a passenger was
banned from flying and thus prevented from obtaining urgent
medical care.
Additionally, a curious issue the court has yet to address when
acknowledging a right to international air travel but not domes-
tic air travel is what freedom, if any, do travelers have to flights
to the non-continental United States?1 1 5 The same justifications
used to declare a constitutional right to international travel will
certainly pertain to travel to Hawaii for example.11 6 Yet, the Priv-
ileges and Immunities Clause requires that the citizens of all
states be entitled to the same rights and privileges.1 7 Thus if
those citizens of the state of Hawaii can claim a constitutionally
protected right to air travel to and from their home state, it fol-
lows that citizens of every state should be granted a right to air
travel to and from their home state.
In summation, when domestic air travel becomes the only
practical method of fulfilling other fundamental rights, then it
too should be protected under the Constitution. If, however,
there are other reasonable avenues of travel available, be it car,
boat, rail, or bike, then people have no guaranteed right to fly.
As American society becomes increasingly dependent on flight
for basic domestic travel, the courts may too evolve their juris-
prudence and recognize a constitutional right to fly.
III. LIMITATIONS ON RECOGNIZING A "RIGHT TO FLY'
This next section explores what it means to have a protected
right to air travel generally and discusses the practical limita-
tions of that constitutional right. Unless the Supreme Court was
to do a 180-degree turn from the lower courts' precedent and
embrace, and extend, Justice Stewart's belief that interstate
travel is a "virtually unconditional personal right" free from gov-
115 See Sobel, supra note 28.
116 See Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1134.
117 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Although the Privi-
leges and Immunities clause generally applies to state laws discriminating against
nonresidents, the judiciary refusing to recognize the right itself to the majority of
the population would certainly offend the purpose of the clause.
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ernmental and private interference,"' a constitutional right to
fly would not mean that Americans have an unrestricted guaran-
tee to domestic flight. But what would an unencumbered right
to fly look like? What would be the consequences of this hypo-
thetical extreme?
A. UNENCUMBERED RIGHT TO FLY
If the freedom to fly was virtually unconditional, the conse-
quences to the airline industry would be disastrous. Inevitably,
some plaintiffs would attempt to claim infringement on their
constitutional guarantee when they were denied travel because
of a weather or technical delay, or more likely, when they were
bumped from a flight." 9 Airlines would be subject to constant
litigation. Additionally, a complete overhaul of the commercial
airline industry would likely result. Airlines would have to cease
many of their common practices such as overbooking flights, to
avoid, not just a few disgruntled passengers, but a few costly law-
suits. Likewise, airlines would be prevented from canceling
flights for economic reasons, at least to the extent that any pas-
sengers were completely prohibited from flying. The airlines
would be limited in their ability to determine their own flight
schedules, destinations, and pricing: potential causes of action
would lurk behind seemingly exorbitant ticket prices or re-
stricted service to and from certain airports. Commercial air-
lines are in the business of making money and burdening them
with passengers' unencumbered right to fly would critically hin-
der their ability to function profitably.
Additionally, any legislation that prevented a traveler from fly-
ing to her desired location would be unconstitutional. Take, for
example, the Wright Amendment.1 2° Passed in 1979, the law
"prohibited carriers from flying [from Love Field in Dallas] to
any point outside Texas, or its four border states (Louisiana, Ar-
kansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico), unless the aircraft carried
no more than fifty-six passengers." 121 In Cramer v. Skinner, an air-
118 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642-43 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
119 See Lindsey Ray Altmeyer, Note, The Montreal Convention-The Eleventh Cir-
cuit Embraces Airlines' Practice of "Bumping" to Deny Plaintiffs' Recovery for Personal
Injury Under Article 17, 80 J. AIR L. & COM. 239.
120 SeeJennifer Wang, Comment, Time for Congress to Spread Love in the Air: Why
the Wight Amendment was Wrong Before, and Why it Deserves Repeal Today, 70J. AIR L.
& CoM. 353 (2005).
121 Id. at 354.
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line passenger sued to challenge the law as unconstitutional. 122
The plaintiff alleged that the amendment infringed on his fun-
damental right to interstate travel.'2 The court disagreed, hold-
ing that the amendment did not actually deter travel because he
"remain[ed] free to travel unrestricted to points outside the
Love Field service area from Dallas by using DFW, or he [could]
take a second flight from a point within the Love Field service
area." 1 24 Likewise, the State of Kansas, in Kansas v. United States,
challenged the Wright Amendment as an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the right to interstate travel.1 25 The D.C. District Court
held that the amendment "operate [d] only as an inconsequen-
tial impediment to the right to travel and [did] not implicate
the fundamental right. '" 126
However, an "inconsequential impediment" to some may be a
complete bar to others. When faced with paying higher prices to
fly out of DFW airport or taking advantage of Southwest Air-
line's often lower fares out of Love Field, but potentially sacrific-
ing an entire day of travel one-way, some travelers would be
forced to simply not travel. A law that would coerce travelers to
not fly when faced with two such "evils" would undoubtedly be
deemed unconstitutional against a broad right to fly.
Finally, as discussed fully herein, an unencumbered, unlim-
ited right to air travel could create dire safety concerns. The gov-
ernment's No-Fly List would be unconstitutional thereby
foreclosing on a popular, albeit controversial, counterterrorism
tool. 1 27 Passengers would be allowed to board a flight even if
they did not present proper identification or refused to undergo
the required security measures. Flight crews would be hindered
from removing unruly or suspect passengers from a flight. Even
Justice Stewart would have agreed, given these potential conse-
quences to the airline industry and aviation safety, courts are
certain to reject a right to air travel that extends to a virtually
unconditional liberty against governmental and private interfer-
122 Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1031 (5th Cir. 1991); see Wang, supra
note 120, at 358.
123 Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1031.
124 Id.
125 Kansas v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 1042, 1052 (D.D.C. 1992), affd sub
nom. State of Kan. v. United States, 16 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see Wang, supra
note 120.
126 Kansas, 797 F. Supp. at 1052.
127 Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watchlists, 61 Burr. L. REv 461
(2013).
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ence. After all, most rights, even those sacred to the foundation
of our society, are not without limits. 128
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Recognizing the right to air travel as a constitutional guaran-
tee limits the restrictions that can be placed on that right by the
government; it does not prohibit the government from placing
any restrictions on that right. Implementation of the right, often
through standards of review, reveals the limitations courts are
willing to allow on a constitutional mandate. 129 The standard of
review to be used, thus the extent to which the government
could enact restrictions, often depends on the status of the right
as "fundamental.' 3 0
If the Court were to consider the right to domestic air travel
as a fundamental right, any law infringing that right would then
be subject to strict scrutiny.' 3' Under strict scrutiny, laws are un-
constitutional unless proven to be necessary to further a compel-
ling state interest; only those laws that are narrowly tailored and
essential will pass constitutional muster. 3 2 The question be-
comes, then, should laws restricting domestic air travel be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny? The Supreme Court has generally
concluded that the right to travel is a fundamental right and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.13 3 The issue that often arises,
especially in cases involving residency requirements as a hin-
drance to interstate travel, is the point at which "the amount of
impact on the right to travel . . . [invokes] the application of
heightened scrutiny."'3 4 As Justice O'Connor summarized,
"heightened scrutiny is appropriate only if the statutory classifi-
cation penalizes, actually deters, or is primarily intended to im-
128 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
129 "No right is absolute, and the extent to which legislation can permissibly
burden a right is largely determined by the doctrinal rules, tests, and other de-
vices the Court adopts to 'implement' the right. One prominent way of imple-
menting constitutional mandates is a standard of review, such as strict scrutiny or
rational basis, which is used to judge the constitutionality of laws burdening the
right." Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REv. 683,
685 (2007).




133 See id.; Saenz v. Roe, 536 U.S. 489 (1999); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55
(1975); Mem. Hospital v. Maricopa Cty, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
134 Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 921 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
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pede the exercise of the right to travel.... [S]omething more
than a negligible or minimal impact on the right to travel is re-
quired before strict scrutiny is applied." ' In other words, not
every infringement on travel gives rise to a constitutional
claim. 136
The Court would logically extend the same standard to a right
to air travel: strict scrutiny would apply if the classification penal-
izes, deters, or is intended to impede domestic air travel.13 7 Al-
ternatively, if the Court recognizes a constitutional right to fly in
only those circumstances where flight is necessary to exercise an
underlying fundamental right, as this article suggests, then the
right to fly should by extension be treated as a fundamental
right and strict scrutiny should apply.
On the other hand, where the underlying purpose of air
travel is not a fundamental liberty, minimal scrutiny would apply
and governmental restrictions on the right to fly would be up-
held, as long as they were related to a legitimate state interest. 138
Under rational basis review, courts are highly deferential to the
legislature; therefore, many of the government's current restric-
tions, such as the No-Fly List, could be upheld. 139
C. SECTION 1983 LIMITATION
A final limitation to a constitutional right to fly is the availabil-
ity of redress from a private party in violation of the right. Many
complaints regarding air travel are the result of the commercial
airlines themselves: flight cancellations, delays, or treatment by
the flight crew. To the surprise of many lay Americans, and
young law students, the guarantees afforded in the Bill of Rights
do not themselves provide for a private cause of action. Not un-
til the passing of 42 U.S.C 1983 (commonly referred to as Sec-
tion 1983) were "victims" of a constitutional right violation able
to bring a cause of action.1 40 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
135 Id. at 920-21 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
136 "If every infringement on interstate travel violates the traveler's fundamen-
tal constitutional rights, any governmental act that limits the ability to travel in-
terstate, such as placing a traffic light before an interstate bridge, would raise a
constitutional issue." Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1031 (5th Cir. 1991).
137 See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 920-21.
138 See id.
139 See MAssEy, supra note 57, at 675.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law. ...
Section 1983 only allows causes of action, however, against the
federal and state governments or "state actors" acting under
"color of law. 1 4 2 Therefore, except for very limited circum-
stances, a party would not be able to sue an airline for the al-
leged violation of his constitutional right.
The determination, then, turns on whether an airline is, or
can ever be considered, a "state actor" for purposes of a Section
1983 claim. As the Second Circuit articulated,
Supreme Court cases on the subject of state action "have not
been a model of consistency," and we therefore have "no single
test to identify state actions and state actors. Rather, there are a
host of factors that can bear on the fairness of an attribution of a
challenged action to the State." Three main tests have emerged:
For the purposes of section 1983, the actions of a nominally pri-
vate entity are attributable to the state ... (1) [when] the entity
acts pursuant to the coercive power of the state or is controlled
by the state ("the compulsion test"); (2) when the state provides
significant encouragement to the entity, the entity is a willful par-
ticipant in joint activity with the state, or the entity's functions
are entwined with state policies ("the joint action test" or "close
nexus test"); or (3) when the entity has been delegated a public
function by the state ("the public function test")4'
The plaintiff seeking to recover damages against a commercial
airline would, therefore, need to prove that the airline's actions
were attributable to the state. 44
It may seem obvious to some that a commercial airline would
be a "state actor" by any measurable test.145 The industry is
highly regulated by the federal government, airlines serve a valu-
able public function, and airline personnel and government of-
ficials work side-by-side throughout the entire travel process-
from airline customer service agents and TSA agents assisting
with check-in and security, to flight attendants and air marshals
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012).
144 Id.
145 See Nicholas Poppe, Discriminatory Deplaning: Aviation Security and the Consti-
tution, 79J. AIR L. & COM. 113 (2014).
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in-flight, to airline personnel and airport security policing bag-
gage claim and passenger pick-up areas. As Nicholas Poppe rea-
soned, "Congress envisioned that aircraft security would not
simply come under federal regulatory scrutiny, but rather that
the federal government would adopt screening and passenger
safety as part of its responsibility to protect the American
public."'4 6
However, courts have consistently held that air carriers are
not state actors for the purposes of Section 1983.147 The D.C.
District Court held that USAir was not a state actor even though
the airline "[held] a certificate to operate from the federal gov-
ernment," was regulated by the federal government, received
government assistance, and requested FAA police assistance to
remove the plaintiff from the plane. 14 8 A Michigan court re-
jected the plaintiffs claim that American Airlines "acted under
guise of state authority or acted in concert with [the police]"
when the airline "cancelled] the flight and call[ed] the po-
lice."' 49 Additionally, even though a private entity performs a
public function, even one as important as air travel, the Su-
preme Court is reluctant to designate its actions as those "under
color of state law."' 5 0
Therefore, even if the Court were to recognize a constitution-
ally-protected right to interstate air travel, that right would not
be without limits. Like all constitutional guarantees, the govern-
ment could restrict that right within certain classes of people, at
most, by showing that the classification is necessary to further a
compelling state interest.'51 Furthermore, to the extent a pas-
senger's constitutional right was violated by a private party, such
as an airline, the passenger would be without a cause of action
unless he could succeed in convincing the court to depart from
precedent and find that the airline was a state actor acting
under color of state law pursuant to Section 1983.152
146 Id. at 121.
147 See AI-Watan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 816 (E.D. Mich. 2009);
Anderson v. USAir Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1191 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 1985) affd 818 F.2d 49
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
148 Anderson, 619 F. Supp. at 1196.
149 A1-Watan, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
150 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
151 See Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986)
(O'Connor, J. dissenting).
152 See Poppe, supra note 145.
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IV. AVIATION SAFETY CONCERNS
With every measure to increase public security, there is a cor-
responding decrease in personal liberty. As Americans, we sacri-
fice some of our fundamental rights in exchange for safety and
peace-of-mind. The balance between liberty and security is a
tightrope that the legislatures and courts are constantly walk-
ing-a tightrope swinging in the winds of public perception and
enemy threats. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, airline passen-
gers were generally willing to subject themselves to invasive se-
curity measures at the expense of their personal privacy in order
to prevent future terrorism. However, with the memory of the
9/11 attacks fading and the courts slowly embracing a right to
air travel, the winds may soon change away from security and
peace-of-mind towards privacy and the freedom to fly. This sec-
tion provides a discussion of the safety implications a constitu-
tional right to air travel may have on aviation.
As previously noted in this article, commercial airlines are typ-
ically not subject to constitutional claims because they are not
state actors under Section 1983. However, for the sake of discus-
sion, the Supreme Court could conclude that a right to inter-
state air travel not only exists but is so fundamental to the core
of our society that it is virtually unconditional, free from govern-
mental and private interference. To a lesser extreme, the Court
could preempt the lower courts' precedent and find that cir-
cumstances may arise where airlines are state actors acting
under color of state law. And whether the Court deemed all air
travel to be a fundamental right, or following the thesis of this
article, found only that air travel taken with a "fundamental pur-
pose" to be a constitutional right, airlines would likely treat every
passenger as one exercising his fundamental freedom to fly
(rarely would an airline take the time and resources to investi-
gate the purpose of each passenger's travel and inquire into
available travel alternatives). In either instance, airlines would
be liable to passengers for violations of the right to air travel,
perhaps to the detriment of aviation safety.
Currently airline personnel are given broad discretion in de-
ciding whether to transport a passenger and whether to abort a
flight altogether. 5 ' FAA Regulation Section 91.3 provides that
the "pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for,
and is the final authority as to, the operation of the aircraft."'54
153 Id.
1-54 14 C.F.R. § 91.3; see Poppe, supra note 145.
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Likewise, an airline "may refuse to transport a passenger or
property the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to
safety." '155 As a result, if an airline captain has reason to believe
that a passenger is disruptive or a threat to himself or others, the
captain has the authority to remove the passenger.156 This safety
measure would be significantly undermined if the passengers
were guaranteed a right to fly.
An airline captain would likely hesitate to remove an unruly
traveler for fear of subsequent litigation. This predicament
would put pilots in difficult positions, forcing them to make in-
stant decisions as to when the disruption was "disruptive
enough" to violate the passenger's constitutional right. Even
seemingly nonthreatening passengers, heavily intoxicated trav-
elers, for example, could inhibit the flight crew from effectively
doing theirjobs that could result in injury to passengers or crew.
On the other hand, public servants, such as policemen, make
these tough decisions every day; they are constantly balancing
public safety with an individual's personal liberties. Society trusts
police officers to provide security in our neighborhoods while
demanding that they respect each person's constitutional guar-
antees. Arguably, airline passengers expect the same from their
pilots and flight crew: society trusts the airlines to provide a safe
flight, from both mechanical and human factors, but also to be
respectful of individual liberties.
Furthermore, every safety law and regulation that abridged
the right to air travel of a class of people could be susceptible to
strict scrutiny and subject to invalidation. This includes the No-
Fly List, requirements for general aviators, and rules governing
the use of private airports. Strict scrutiny of these laws essentially
ensures that a person's right to fly, either commercially as a pas-
senger or privately as a pilot, is paramount to the safety of the
aviation industry, absent a showing that the law is necessary to
the state's interest. Many in the aviation industry may welcome
the idea of purging the thousands of aviation laws and regula-
tions of those that are "unnecessary" to the government's com-
pelling interests. 57  Ultimately, however, the legislatures,
regulatory agencies, and courts will be tasked with ensuring that
the freedom to fly is appropriately balanced with aviation safety.
155 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (2012); see Poppe, supra note 145.
156 See Poppe, supra note 145, at 118-19.
157 See FAA, Regulations & Policies, https://www.faa.gov/regulations policies/
(last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
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V. CONCLUSION
The fundamental right to travel is well-engrained in this coun-
try's jurisprudence. 158 As each new generation becomes more
reliant on air travel to thrive in society, the courts are moving
closer to embracing a constitutional right to fly.' 59 However, a
virtually unconditional right to air travel would present undesir-
able consequences to the commercial airline industry and avia-
tion safety.
Instead of declaring a universal right to interstate air travel,
the courts should focus on the underlying purpose of the flight.
If the purpose is to exercise a fundamental right-pursuing a
business opportunity, fulfilling a religious obligation, or peti-
tioning the government, for example-and if air travel is the
only means to fulfill that underlying right, then the court by ex-
tension should recognize the individual's freedom to fly inter-
state.16° The guarantee is not without limits and the test should
be narrowly tailored, satisfied on the basis of each individual. A
sweeping proclamation of the right to air travel not only goes
against precedent, but becomes an open door for safety con-
cerns and unnecessary litigation.'6 1 However, when a traveler
seeks to exercise a constitutionally protected liberty interest and
domestic air travel is the only practical means available, the
court should honor a person's freedom to fly.
158 Hartch, supra note 4.
159 Id.
160 See Latifv. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014).
161 Mann, supra note 84.
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